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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSHUA JOHN EARL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020821-C A 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of clandestine laboratory 
pi en. in soi's ami i HI equipment, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37d-4(l)(1998). This Court has jurisdiction i> !n. i!f;fl«t o"fi« »n|i '; "'"! \\ H2 »k i i:1m1» 
S T A T E M E N T o p I S S U E S 
Issue. Did the trial court properly IUMIN drfniftinfs molion in suppress n ninny 
seized pursuant to a consent to search and a search incident to arrest? 
i he factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential cleai ly ei 1 oneoi is 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
\?.\\n\ fn 11 u; tut! iiidfj't'*"'. .ip|ilir<ilii 11 1 llir legal slaiul.ini In llic lacts. * State v. Moreno, 910 
P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with possessing clandestine laboratory precursors and/or 
equipment within a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
B misdemeanor. R. 4-7. Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant 
over for trial on all charges. R. 26-27, 277. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, 
arguing that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. R. 35-39. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R. 127-32, 278-79. Pursuant to a 
subsequent plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of possessing clandestine 
laboratory precursors and/or equipment, a second degree felony, and the remaining two 
counts were dismissed. R. 233-42. Defendant conditioned his guilty plea on the right to 
appeal the trial court's suppression order. R. 234-35. The trial court sentenced defendant to 
a prison term of one-to-fifteen years. R. 256. Defendant timely appealed. R. 262-63. 
2 
Summary of Facts 
Sheila Gledhill and her husband owned a house that was located next to the husband's 
business in South Salt Lake. R. 278: 8-11. Pursuant to a verbal agreement reached in May 
2001, she rented the house to her son Jeremy Allen. R. 278: 8-9. Although he was supposed 
to pay $350 per month in rent, Allen performed yard work and other tasks in lieu of rent. R. 
278: 9. However, by November 2001, Mrs. Gledhill decided to evict Allen because "he 
hadn't followed through with the rent, and [ ] was not maintaining the inside of the home" as 
agreed. R. 278: 9. 
On the morning of November 4, 2001, Mrs. Gledhill drove to the house to evict her 
son.1 R. 278: 8, 23. Upon arriving, she noticed that an unauthorized truck was parked 
behind her husband's business. R. 278: 10,23. Assuming that it belonged to someone that 
was at the house, Mrs. Gledhill called police on her cell phone to have them remove it. R. 
278:10,23. Dispatch told her that because it was on private property, she would have to call 
a towing company. R. 278: 23. She then went to a nearby convenience store to look up a 
towing company in the telephone book. R. 278: 23. While there, a young female clerk 
informed Mrs. Gledhill that "a skinhead named Marvin" had told the clerk that he was living 
at the home and "running a meth lab there." R. 278: 8, 10-11. After learning this, Mrs. 
Gledhill again called police and asked that they accompany her to keep the peace while she 
evicted her son. R. 278: 8, 12-13, 19-20, 26. 
1
 Mrs. Gledhill had not given her son notice of her intent to evict him. R. 278: 20. 
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Shortly after Mrs. Gledhill called, Officer Dean Brimley from the South Salt Lake 
Police Department met her at her husband's business. R. 278:11,20-21,26. Mrs. Gledhill 
told Officer Brimley that she wished to evict her son because he was using 
methamphetamine and marijuana and because she had received information that a meth lab 
was inside the house. R. 278: 26-27,38. After discussing the situation with Mrs. Gledhill, 
Officer Brimley accompanied her to the house. R. 278: 13.2 Using her own key, Mrs. 
Gledhill entered the house through the front door and Officer Brimley followed her inside. 
R. 278:13-14,21,27. When they entered the house, Allen, defendant—whom Mrs. Gledhill 
had never before seen—and two other men were sitting around the kitchen table at a 
computer. R. 278: 8,14-17,20,27-29.3 
The house was "trashed," with clothes and garbage lying everywhere. R. 278: 21. 
Small iodine bottles and several boxes of pseudophedrine (Sudafed), both used in the 
manufacture of methamphetamine, were also lying in plain view on the floor next to the 
couch, and a glass marijuana pipe was lying on the coffee table in front of the couch. R. 278: 
14,17-18,29,50-51-52,55,57. A backpack, later discovered to be defendant's, was also in 
the living room. R. 278: 22,24-25, 35-36. 
2
 Mrs. Gledhill testified that Officer Brimley and a second officer accompanied her 
into the house. R. 278: 13-14. Officer Brimley, on the other hand, testified that only he 
accompanied her into the house and that Officer Loosle joined them shortly thereafter. R. 
278: 27. 
3
 Mrs. Gledhill later learned that defendant is the stepson of her ex-husband. R. 278: 
19; see also R. 278:58. 
4 
On seeing the drug paraphernalia, Officer Brimley radioed to his backup officer and 
requested that he hasten his arrival. R. 278: 30. To ensure his safety, Officer Brimley 
directed all four men to step out of the kitchen into the living room, within eight to ten feet of 
the backpack, and requested their identification. R. 278: 31,37,40-41. At about this same 
time, Officer Loosle arrived as backup. R. 278: 31. All but defendant provided Officer 
Brimley photo identification. R. 278: 30. Defendant claimed that he had no identification 
and verbally identified himself as Justin Gannon. R. 277: 8; R. 278: 30. Officer Brimley 
asked defendant whether he had any weapons on him. R. 278:32. When defendant affirmed 
that he did, Officer Brimley frisked him, discovering a large knife concealed under his shirt 
in the small of his back. R. 278: 32, 43-44. He also found a pocket knife in defendant's 
pocket. R. 278: 32. 
During the pat down, Officer Brimley felt a wallet and requested permission to 
retrieve the wallet, which defendant granted. R. 278: 32-33, 44. When Officer Brimley 
examined the identification in the wallet, he found a Utah I.D. card and discovered that 
defendant had given him a false name and date of birth. R. 278: 33, 44. On learning 
defendant's real identity, Officer Brimley arrested him for giving false information, 
handcuffed him, sat him on the couch against which the backpack was leaning, and radioed 
for a warrants check. R. 278: 33-34,45. 
Then, because of his concerns for safety, Officer Brimley escorted all four men 
outside and obtained Allen's written consent to search the house. R. 278: 35, 42, 45. He 
also requested the presence of Officer Scott Daniels, the team leader for the department's 
5 
meth lab unit. R. 278: 45,47-48. A search of the house did not uncover any glassware for a 
meth lab, but did uncover various chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. 
R. 278: 48, 50. While searching the house, Officer Brimley searched the backpack lying in 
the living room. R. 278: 36, 45. In it, Officer Brimley found scales, rubber stoppers, 
additional bottles of iodine, red sludge (red phosphorous), a blue plastic container with 48 
pseudophedrine pills, and a book entitled, "Advanced Techniques for Clandestine Labs." R. 
277:11,14-15; R. 278:36,50-53. Officer Brimley also found some court documents which 
he traced to defendant. R. 278: 36. Allen later confirmed that the backpack belonged to 
defendant. R. 278: 36,42-43.4 
Mrs. Gledhill testified that although defendant did not have permission to stay at the 
house, Allen had authority to allow him to be there as a visitor. R. 278: 19. Defendant 
testified that Allen said he could live at the house until he found another place to stay and 
claimed that he had been living there since October. R. 278: 58-60. However, defendant 
never told any of the officers that he was living there, nor did he tell them not to search the 
residence. R. 278: 59-61. He paid no rent. R. 278: 61. 
A call to the court revealed that the case number on the court documents matched 
defendant. R. 278: 36. 
6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court concluded that the search of defendant's backpack was justified as a 
search incident to arrest, pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and pursuant to Jeremy Allen's 
consent to search. Although defendant challenges all three justifications, the Court must 
affirm if any one supports the search. 
A search incident to arrest is valid if (1) the arrest is lawful, (2) the search is within 
the area of the arrestee's immediate control, and (3) the search is contemporaneous with the 
arrest. The trial court concluded that the search satisfied all three requirements. Defendant 
challenged only the lawfulness of the arrest in his suppression motion, but he has conceded 
its lawfulness on appeal. And as in the trial court below, defendant has not challenged the 
trial court's conclusions respecting the last two requirements of the analysis. Instead, 
defendant urges the Court to adopt a different analysis requiring an inquiry into whether 
there was a reasonable concern for safety justifying the search. Because he did not make this 
argument below, he has waived it and this Court should not consider it on appeal. In any 
event, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that all custodial arrests should be 
treated alike and has rejected the analysis proposed by defendant. This Court should thus 
affirm the trial court's conclusion that the search was valid as a search incident to arrest. 
Because defendant was not a resident, temporary or otherwise, but merely a casual 
visitor, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in Jeremy Allen's home and he may not 
challenge the trial court's ruling pertaining to the plain view doctrine or the validity of 
Allen's consent. Nor did defendant demonstrate an expectation of privcay in the backback. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE 
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that the search was 
justified (1) as a search incident to arrest, see R. 131-32: ff 11-15; (2) under the plain view 
doctrine, see R. 129-30: fflf 1-6; and (3) pursuant to Jeremy Allen's consent, see R. 130-31: 
f f 7-9.5 On appeal, defendant challenges the application of all three exceptions. First, he 
argues that the plain view doctrine does not apply because Mrs. Gledhill had neither actual 
nor apparent authority to enter the house and authorize police entry into the premises. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 9-25. Second, he argues that Allen's consent to search the premises was not 
voluntary, was the product of the prior illegality, and did not, in any event, extend to the 
backpack. See Aplt. Brf. at 26-39. Third, he acknowledges that the arrest was lawful, but 
urges the Court to discard in this case the present standard for searches incident to arrest in 
favor of a different standard never before applied by any court. See Aplt. Brf. at 40-46. 
A. THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S BACKPACK WAS JUSTIFIED AS A 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Searches conducted by police without a warrant are "presumptively unreasonable." 
See Paytonv. New York, 445 U.S. 573,5S6, lOOS.Ct. 1371,1380(1980). Nevertheless, "the 
presumption against warrantless searches is not without its exceptions — " City ofOrem v. 
Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1387 (Utah App. 1994). One such exception is a search incident to a 
5
 The court also concluded that Officer Brimley was justified in conducting a pat-
down search for weapons. R. 131: f 10. Defendant has not challenged this conclusion. 
8 
lawful arrest. State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 22,57 P.3d 1052. Under this exception, police 
may search a lawfully arrested person and areas within his or her immediate control for both 
weapons and evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 
(1969);. 'The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes [the] search." Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631 (1979). A search incident to arrest is 
justified "if (1) the arrest is lawful; (2) the search is of the area within the arrestee's 
immediate control; and (3) the search is conducted contemporaneously to the arrest." State 
v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1117-18 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that the search of 
his backpack met these requirements, nor could he. See Aplt. Brf. at 40-46. An arrest is 
lawful "if it is supported by probable cause and authorized by statute." Trane, 2002 UT 97, 
at ^ f 25. Where defendant gave a false name and date of birth in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-507 (1999), Officer Brimley was authorized to arrest him. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
7-2(1) (1999); Trane, 2002 UT 97, at f 28. Although elsewhere in his brief defendant 
challenges the legality of Officer Brimley's entry into Allen's residence, Aplt. Brf. at 13-25, 
he concedes that the alleged illegal entry did not render unlawful his subsequent arrest for an 
intervening offense. See Aplt. Brf. at 40 (acknowledging applicability of State v. Griego, 
9 
933 P.2d 1003,1008 (Utah App. 1997)).6 Defendant does not challenge, nor did he below, 
the trial court's conclusion that the search of the backpack, which was only 8-10 feet away 
from him when he was arrested, R. 278: 37, "was within the area of Defendant's immediate 
control considering Defendant's physical proximity to the backpack, the position of the 
Officer and the Defendant in relation to the area of the backpack, and the number of Officers 
(one) verses the number of suspects (four)," R. 131(13).7 See Aplt. Brf at 41-46. And 
finally, defendant does not challenge, nor did he below, the trial court's conclusion that the 
search "was contemporaneous with Defendant's lawful arrest," R. 132(14). Because the 
6
 In Griego, this Court held that "[a]n illegal entry or prior illegality by officers does 
not affect the subsequent arrest of the defendant where there is an intervening illegal act by 
the suspect." Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008; accord Trane, 2002 UT 97, atfflf 33-35. In the court 
below, defendant argued that his arrest "was unlawful because the officers' warrantless entry 
into the home was unlawful " R. 66. However, defendant has abandoned that claim on 
appeal in light of Griego, acknowledging that he committed an "intervening illegal act" 
justifying his arrest when he gave police a false name and date of birth. Aplt. Brf. at 40-41. 
7
 As observed by this Court, "[p]olice restraint and physical removal of the arrestee,.. 
. while limiting the arrestee's ability to actually reach into a particular area, does not 
automatically prohibit police from search the area." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 785 
n.29 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). Indeed, where the officers were 
outnumbered four to two, R. 278: 27, 31, all of the men were larger than at least Officer 
Brimley, R. 278:28, and the officer expressed concern for his safety, see R. 278:35, removal 
of the men from the living room before conducting the search was eminently reasonable, 
especially in light of the fact that defendant had already been found with a large knife and 
apparently only he was handcuffed. See State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 979 (Utah App. 
1998) (noting that "the number of officers present in relation to the number of arrestees or 
other persons" is a relevant factor); see also United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.) 
(upholding search incident to arrest where only a few minutes had passed between arrest and 
search, defendant was taken to next room out of concern for safety, a gun was found in the 
room where defendant had been arrested, and defendant was held near the site of arrest), 
cert, denied, 502 U.S 830, 112 S.Ct. 103 (1991). 
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three requirements have been satisfied, this Court should affirm the trial court's order 
denying the motion to suppress. 
Defendant urges the Court to add "an extra layer of analysis" to the inquiry to 
determine whether there was in fact a reasonable concern for safety, similar to that required 
for a reasonable suspicion weapons frisk under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 
(1968). Aplt. Brf. at 42-43. However, he did not make this argument to the trial court as a 
basis for suppression, opting instead to merely challenge the lawfulness of the arrest, and the 
trial court thus had no opportunity to address defendant's novel argument. See R. 35-39,56-
66, 278. Where, as here, a defendant seeks reversal based on a theory not presented to the 
trial court below, it is "waived and cannot be presented on appeal." State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 
98, % 22, 61 P.3d 1000. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's order. 
Even on the merits, defendant's proposed standard should be rejected. In United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467 (1973), the United States Supreme Court 
rejected the very analysis proposed by defendant here. As noted by this Court, searches 
incident to arrest "are necessary to remove any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use in 
order to resist arrest or effect his escape as well as to search for and seize any evidence . . . to 
prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). The U.S. Supreme Court in Robinson 
held that the extended exposure that necessarily follows an arrest provides "an adequate basis 
for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification," regardless of the 
particular circumstances of the arrest. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35, 94 S.Ct. at 476 
11 
(emphasis added); accord DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 35, 99 S.Ct. at 2631. For this reason, 
Robinson rejected the very Terry-type analysis now proposed by defendant. Id. at 235, 94 
S.Ct. at 476. Moreover, because a custodial arrest based on probable cause is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, a search incident to that arrest is also reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 235, 94 S.Ct. at 477. In other words, so long as the arrest is 
lawful, officers should not be handicapped in their ability to ensure their safety and preserve 
evidence.8 
Defendant nevertheless argues that this "extra layer of analysis is required to ensure 
that the officers are not exploiting the illegal conduct to arrest a person and search their 
belongings under the pretext of a search incident to arrest." Aplt. Brf. at 42. A pretext is 
defined as "an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real intention or state of affairs," 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1797 (1993), or, stated colloquially, as "a phony 
reason for some action," Logan v. Caterpillar, Inc., 246 F.3d 912,920 (7th Cir. 2001). Yet, 
the authority of police to make an arrest following a prior police illegality arises only if there 
is an intervening illegal act. See State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah App. 1997). In 
other words, the lawfulness of the arrest is wholly dependent on the actions of the suspect 
after the police illegality. That police would act illegally in the hope that a suspect would 
It is also worthy of note that the Utah Supreme Court in Trane upheld a search 
incident to an arrest for interfering with an officer although the interference arose out of an 
alleged unlawful order by police. See Trane, 2002 UT 97, at Kf 30-36 (holding that "'[t]he 
societal interest in the orderly settlement of disputes between citizens and their government 
outweighs any individual interest in resisting a questionable search'"). 
12 
commit an intervening offense seems highly improbable. They not only risk losing 
evidence, but they might also risk liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Because resolution of this claim is dispositive of the appeal, this Court may affirm on 
that basis alone and need not address the latter two claims. Nevertheless, defendant's latter 
two claims also fail. 
B. DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
IN THE HOUSE 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's conclusion that the evidence was lawfully 
seized under the plain view doctrine and pursuant to Jeremy Allen's consent. Aplt. Brf. at 9-
34. These claims, however, fail because defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in Mrs. Gledhill's house. 
"Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously 
asserted." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425 (1978) (quoting 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,174, 89 S.Ct. 961,966 (1969)). Accordingly, "in 
order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that 
he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is 
reasonable " Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 472 (1998); accord State 
v. Kolster, 869 P.2d 993,995 (Utah App. 1994).9 
9
 A reasonable expectation of privacy is defined as "one that society is prepared to 
recognize as 'reasonable.'" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); accord Kolster, 869 P.2d at 995. 
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In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,96-97,110 S.Ct. 1684,1688 (1990), the United 
States Supreme Court held that an overnight guest enjoys "an expectation of privacy in the 
home [of his or her host] that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." As such, an 
overnight guest may claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment against an unreasonable 
search of that home. Id. However, the trial court specifically found that defendant "was not 
a resident" of the house, discounting entirely as "not credible" defendant's testimony to the 
contrary. R. 129: f 22; R. 130: f 8. As such, the trial court correctly concluded that he had 
no standing to challenge the entry or subsequent search. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's finding, Aplt. Brf. at 9, but does not meet the 
heavy burden required to upset that finding, The trial court's factual findings at a 
suppression hearing are reviewed for clear error. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 
1998). To successfully challenge a trial court finding, "defendant 'must demonstrate to 
appellate courts first how the trial court found the facts from the evidence, and second why 
such findings contradict the weight of the evidence.'" State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3, \ 7,18 
P.3d 1116 (quotingIn re 5.T., 928 P.2d 393,400 (Utah App. 1996)). In reviewing the trial 
court's decision, the Court "'considers] the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination' and defer[s] to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility." State v. 
Mogen, 2002 UT App 235, f 16,52 P.3d 462 (quoting State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655,657 
(Utah App. 1996)). The Court will not upset a factual finding unless it reaches "a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Loya, 2001 UT App 3, at \ 7 (internal 
quotes and citations omitted). 
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Defendant incorrectly asserts that the State presented no evidence that he was not 
living at the house. Aplt.Brf. at 11-12. To the contrary, Mrs. Gledhill testified that only her 
son Jeremy had permission to reside at the house. R. 278: 10. And although Mrs. Gledhill 
indicated a concern that another person might also have been staying at the house, the 
evidence suggested that it was someone named Marvin, not defendant. See R. 278:10 (store 
clerk indicating that "a skinhead named Marvin" had told her that he lived there). 
In challenging the trial court's finding, defendant points only to his testimony that he 
was living there until he found another place to stay. Aplt. Brf. at 11-12. However, the trial 
court specifically found that defendant was "not credible" and discounted his testimony 
"entirely." R. 129: % 22. Because the trial court is "in the best position to assess the 
credibility of witnesses," State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994), this Court must defer 
to that assessment. Mogen, 2002 UT App 235, at ^  16. Certainly, it cannot be said with any 
conviction that the trial court made a mistake in finding that defendant was not a resident, 
temporary or otherwise. See Loya, 2001 UT App 3, at f 7. 
Relying on State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), rev *d, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1992), defendant nevertheless argues that as a social visitor, he had a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in Allen's house sufficient to challenge the search. Aplt. Brf. at 12. In Rowe, the 
Court of Appeals held that depending on the circumstances of the case, even visitors of 
relatively short duration have a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to challenge the 
validity of an intrusion into the premises. 806 P.2d at 735-36. The Utah Supreme Court, 
however, "reverse[d] the decision of the court of appeals," albeit on different grounds. State 
15 
v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1992). The authority of the court of appeals decision is 
thus tenuous at best, especially in light of Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469 
(1998). 
The Supreme Court's decision in Carter may be viewed as treating visitors at the 
home of another as falling along a continuum. At one end of the spectrum is the overnight 
guest, who "typif[ies] those who may claim, the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the 
home of another." Id. at 91,119 S.Ct. at 474. At the other end of the spectrum is one that is 
"merely present with the consent of the householder" or is otherwise "legitimately" on the 
premises, who typif[ies] those who may not [claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment]." Id. at 90-91,119 S.Ct. at 473-74. With this continuum in mind, the Court 
observed that the respondents (1) were not overnight guests, (2) were in the home for only a 
few hours, (3) were only in the home to conduct a commercial transaction (a drug deal), and 
(4) had no prior relationship with the householder. Id. at 90-91,119 S.Ct. at 473-74. Based 
on these facts, the Supreme Court "conclude[d] that the respondents' situation [was] closer to 
that of one simply permitted on the premises.'' Id. at 91, 119 S.Ct. at 474. The Court thus 
held that the search did not violate the respondents' Fourth Amendment rights. 
Where, as here, the State challenges a defendant's "standing" to make a Fourth 
Amendment challenge, see R. 46, the burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of 
privacy is on the defendant State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 886-87 & n.8 (Utah App. 
1990); accord United States v. Dunning, 312 F.3d 528,531 (1st Cir. 2002). Defendant failed 
to meet this burden. 
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The only evidence defendant presented at the suppression hearing was his own 
testimony that he was staying at the house until he found another place to live. See R. 278: 
58, 61. As noted, the trial court found defendant's testimony "not credible," R. 129: f 22, 
and no one else testified to establish defendant's connection to the premises. At best, 
therefore, the evidence establishes that defendant was merely a casual visitor at Allen's 
home. At worst—given the contraband lying in open view around defendant's backpack, the 
contraband found inside defendant's backpack, and the meth lab instruction book in the 
backpack—the evidence suggests that defendant was at the residence in connection with a 
commercial enterprise to manufacture methamphetamine. In either case, defendant cannot 
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the premises. See United States v. Torres, 
162 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant "was nothing more than a casual 
visitor in the apartment, and, as such, had no reasonable expectation of privacy there"), cert, 
denied, 526 U.S. 1057,119 S.Ct. 1370(1999); United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288,294-95 
(6th Cir.) (holding that a temporary visitor may not claim Fourth Amendment protection, 
particularly where he is "on the premises for the sole purpose of engaging in drug-related 
business transactions"), cert denied, 534 U.S. 966,122 S.Ct. 378 (2001). 
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In summary, as in Carter, defendant's situation "is closer to that of one simply 
permitted on the premises" and the entry and search by police did not therefore violate his 
Fourth Amendment rights. Carter, 525 U.S. at 91, 119 S.Ct. at 474.l0 
Defendant nevertheless contends that Allen did not have authority to consent to the 
search of his backpack. However, under the circumstances of the case, the officers were 
justified in believing that Allen's consent covered a search of the backpack. This Court 
"lookjs] to how defendants manifest their expectations regarding the object searched to 
determine their subjective privacy interest." Kolster, 869 P.2d at 995. Defendant here 
manifested no expectation of privacy in the backpack. While it is true that a backpack could 
belong to any one of the four men in the premises, defendant took no steps to secure it. It 
was left in a common area of the house (the living room) and was surrounded by contraband, 
thus reducing any expectation of privacy he may have had in it. See United States v. Burnett, 
890 F.2d 1233, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that "[a] visitor's expectation of privacy is 
particularly tenuous in an apartment's common areas"). Moreover, when the four men were 
taken outside and Allen was asked to consent to a search, defendant did not assert a right of 
ownership over anything in the house. See Kolster, 869 P.2d at 995 (noting that defendant 
10
 Moreover, unlike a co-habitant of a home, a casual visitor may not consent to a 
search of even the common areas of a home. Cf. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993 (1974). Accordingly, it cannot be said that he has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in those premises such that he may assert Fourth Amendment 
protection. 
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never asserted an interest in the package).11 Finally, Officer Daniels testified that defendant 
"originally said that he owned nothing in the backpack and it wasn't his." R.277:13. Itwas 
not until they identified the backpack as belonging to him did he claim ownership. See R. 
278: .36. Having originally denied ownership, defendant cannot now legitimately claim that 
he had an expectation of privacy in the backpack. See State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, f 
47,61 P.3d291; United States v. Garzon, 119F.3d 1446,1449-52 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that defendant abandons any expectation of privacy when he denies ownership of the 
property). 
In sum, because defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
premises and things searched, he cannot claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 
This Court should not therefore address his challenges to the trial court's conclusions 
regarding the plain view doctrine and Allen's consent. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, it is reasonable to assume that defendant 
was aware of the request for consent since all four were escorted outside together. 
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ADDENDUM 
flLES DISTRICT COURf 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 8 2002 
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666
 S ^ ^ H COUNTY •». 
Utah Attorney General _ 
' 3 7 — i Colleen K. Coebergh #8052 oeputyc** 
Assistant Attorney General 
348 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801)524-3080 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, Screened by: Colleen K. Coebergh 
Assigned to: Colleen K. Coebergh 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSHUA JOHN EARL ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Defendant 
Case No. 011919597 
Judge Hon. Sheila McCleve 
This matter having come before the Court on the 3rd day of April, 2002, on the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the State of Utah, appearing by and through its prosecutor, 
Colleen K. Coebergh, Defendant appearing personally and by and through his counsel, Ralph 
Dellapiana of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association; the Court having heard and considered 
testimony of witnesses Sheila Gledhill, Dean Brimley, and Scott Daniels, and having received 
and considered Defendant's Motion, the State's Response thereto, and the Defendant's Reply, 
and being fully advised in the premises DENIED Defendant's Motion at hearing April 15th, 2002, 
for grounds and reasons outlined herein. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
(1) Property owner Sheila Gledhill requested assistance of the police to enter into her 
property at 34 West 2700 South, an address within South Salt Lake City. 
(2) Ms. Gledhill reported her belief that drug activity was occurring at the residence, 
and stated her intention to enter to evict her son, Jeremy Allen, but was afraid of 
other individuals who might be within the apartment, and requested the police go 
along to ensure her safety. 
(3) Jeremy Allen was the only person whom Sheila Gledhill had authorized to live at 
the address. 
(4) The Officer followed Sheila Gledhill as she entered the front room after opening 
the locked front door with her key. 
(5) From the landing just inside the front door, the Officer could see four males. 
(6) At least three of the males were in a kitchen area, presumably where they could 
have access to knives or other sharp objects. 
(7) Also from the landing area, in an adjacent living room area could be seen drug 
paraphernalia as well as boxes of pseudoephedrine-based medicine, bottles later 
determined to be iodine, a red substance visually consistent with red phosphorus. 
(8) Defendant Joshua John Allen was the male sitting closest to the doorway to the 
livingroom, and as such was closest, within eight to ten feet, to a backpack sitting 
in the area of the couch. 
(9) Substantially contemporaneously with another Officer's arrival, Officer Dean 
Brimley summoned the four males toward him for the purpose of identifying 
them, and removing them from the kitchen for officer safety reasons. 
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The males were asked for identification. 
The Defendant indicated he had no proper identification, and stated his name was 
"Justin Ganon." 
During the pat down of Defendant, a long knife was found concealed under his 
clothing in the small of his back. 
Another knife was found in his front pants pocket. 
The Officer felt what he believed to be a wallet in Defendant's pocket. 
The Defendant was asked for, and granted permission for Officers to remove the 
wallet. 
Inside the wallet was identification indicating Defendant's true identity was that 
of Joshua John Earl. 
Defendant was taken into custody for false information. 
Officers were able to ascertain a backpack near or on the couch was Defendant's. 
Evidence was found in the backpack pertinent to the clandestine laboratory 
offense charged as well as documents suggesting the pack indeed belonged to 
Defendant. 
Jeremy Allen signed a written "consent to search" form authorizing the Officer to 
search 34 West 2700 South. 
The Court finds that Sheila Gledhill granted consent to search the residence. 
Though the Defendant took the stand on April 3rd, 2002, and asserted that he had 
been living at or staying at the residence overnight, the Court finds that testimony 
was not credible, and discounts it entirely. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) Though the initial entry by Officer Brimley was "warrantless," he accompanied 
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the landowner at her request. Therefore, the Court finds that because the 
landowner had a right to enter the property to inspect it, she could confer upon the 
Officer, her invitee, the right to enter with her. 
(2) In other words, entry was with consent given by a person authorized to give 
consent. 
(3) Further, Officer Brimley was justified in believing Ms. Gledhill had authority to 
grant consent to enter the residence, going with her as he did for her inspection of 
the property, and in furtherance of her request to "keep the peace" or protect her 
from unknown dangers during the eviction notice. 
(4) Officer Brimley took reasonable steps to ensure that his entry with the owner was 
lawful by interviewing Ms. Gledhill before the entry to ascertain her ownership, 
relationship to the property and the occupants. 
(5) Ms. Gledhill specifically granted consent to the entry and search conducted by 
the Officers. 
(6) Once inside, from the lawful vantage point Officer Brimley occupied, the items he 
observed in plain view are admissible pursuant to that doctrine. 
(7) Further, the court specifically finds Mr. Jeremy Allen voluntarily granted consent 
to search the residence, and as the renter and occupant of the property, he had 
authority to grant consent to search the residence. 
(8) Joshua John Allen was not a resident, and his consent to search the residence was 
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not required. 
(9) Further, even if Joshua John Allen was a resident, the search of the residence \\ as 
of common areas, for which Jeremy Allen was empowered to, and did grant 
consent. 
(10) The pat down of the person of Defendant which yielded two knives was lawful as 
a "Terry frisk," the court being satisfied that such was justified under the 
circumstances to ensure the Officer's safety because there were four male suspects 
and initially one, then two Officers; the proximity of the male suspects to possible 
weapons; and the Defendant's offering of what the Officer suspected was a false 
identity, heightening the Officer's concern. 
(11) The Defendant voluntarily consented to removal of his wallet. Therefore, 
evidence of his true identity found therein is admissible. 
(12) The Officer was empowered to arrest Defendant for false personal information 
pursuant to §77-7-2(1) U.C.A., 1999, which allows arrest of suspects who commit 
crimes in the presence of the Officer. Therefore the arrest of Defendant was 
lawful. 
(13) The Court concludes the backpack was within the area of Defendant's immediate 
control considering Defendant's physical proximity to the backpack, the position 
of the Officer and the Defendant in relation to the area of the backpack, and the 
number of Officers (one) verses the number of suspects (four). 
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(14) The search of the backpack was contemporaneous with Defendant's lawful arrest. 
(15) As such, search of Defendant's backpack was lawful incident to his arrest, and 
evidence seized pursuant to that search admissible. 
(16) Finally, because the Court finds no illegal search occurred, Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Defendant's Statements based on alleged violations of the Fourth 
Amendment is Denied. 
(17) The Court finds it unnecessary to make any finding regarding whether Ms. 
Gledhill's actions were in violation of State Statutes on Forcible Entry and 
Detainer (§78-36-1 U.C.A., et. seq.) concluding that even if such violation 
occurred, the Statute does not provide a suppression remedy in this criminal 
context, but rather a civil remedy for those aggrieved. 
Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is Denied. 
Dated this'/f day of May, 2002. 
Honorable Sheila K.^ McCteve? f ^ ./ fj 
Judge, Third Judicial^strkt'CHiT^^I^ 
cc: 
Colleen K. Coebergh 
Attorney for the State 
348 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Ralph Dellapiana 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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